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THE LEGAL ARIZONA WORKERS ACT AND
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
Sandraj. Durkin*
in recent years, a spate of states passed laws regulating the employment qf
undocumented inigrants. This Note argues that laws that impose civil sanctions
on employers that hire undocumented innuigrants are preempted by both federal
imnration lanw and federal labor law. The Note focuses specifically on the Legal
Arizona Workers Act because it went into effect in 2008 and has amassed more
than two years' worth of data on its enforcement, and because it is touted as the
harshest state anti-immigration measure to date. This Note examines the law's
impacts and argues that practitioners nationuide should challenge the Legal Arizona
Workers' Act, as well as the proliferation of similar state laws that threaten civil
rights, business and labor interests, and the supremacy qf the federal Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 12, 2008, in the small town of Postville, Iowa, federal au-
thorities arrested nearly 400 employees at a meat processing plant on
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suspected immigration violations.' After eight days of detention, federal
prosecutors went on to press criminal charges for identity theft against
306 of the primarily Mexican and Guatemalan employees.2 The raid drew
criticism from human rights organizations,' religious groups,' politicians,
and even the community of Postvillei Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") officials justified the controversial raid by citing the need to "put
pressure on companies with large numbers of illegal immigrant workers,"
to reduce the number of undocumented immigrants in U.S. borders."
Although the Iowa raid, which is now referred to as "the largest sin-
gle-site operation of its kind in American history," was unusual in
magnitude, it was by no means an isolated incident.' Less than one month
later, in Phoenix, Arizona, local Sheriff's deputies arrested nine employees
at the Waterworld fun-park after receiving information that the employees
used fraudulent identification.' The county attorney's office ultimately
handed down indictments against all nine employees.' The county attor-
ney's office also indicated that the purpose behind the fun-park raid was
to investigate potential violations of the Legal Arizona Workers Act
("LAWA"), a recently-enacted state law which prohibits employers from
hiring undocumented immigrant workers.' Although conducted on a
much smaller scale than the Iowa raid, immigration raids conducted by
state and local authorities are increasing in frequency in Arizona," and the
cumulative results can be just as devastating. Many blame LAWA for in-
creasing the workplace immigration raids that harm many Arizona
residents."
1. Spencer S. Hsu, Imnration Raid Jars a Small Town, WAsH. PosT, May 18, 2008, at
Al.
2. Erik Caniayd-Freixas, Interprctiig after the Largest ICE Raid iii US History: A Per-
sotial Account, Jun. 13, 2008, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/imiages/2008/07/14/opinion/
14ed-camayd.pdf.
3. Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Shockiqtg Raid in lowa After
66 Die in Detention, May 12, 2008, http://icirr.org/node/2455.
4. Samuel G. Freedman, hniqrants Find Solace After Storm ofArrests, N.Y.TIMES,JUl.
12, 2008, at A9.
5. Hsu, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Camayd-Freixas, supra note 2.
8. J.J. Hensley et al., Fun-Park Raids May Test State Hiring. Law, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Jun. 10, 2008, at Al.
9. Michael Kiefer, Migrant Sweep at Water Park Leads to Charges, ARIz. REPUBLiC,Jun.
24, 2008, at A3.
10. Hensley, supra note 8; Legal Arizona Workers Act, ARIZ. KEV. STAl; ANN. § 23-
211 & 212 (2008).
11. State of Fear: Arizona's hinniqration Crackdown (National Radio Project radio
broadcast Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://wwv.radioprojec.org/archive/2008/
4608.html.
12. See, e.g., Lindsay Butler, Businesses Feel Early Pinch of Workers Law, EAsT VAi.LEY
TRIB., Dec. 29, 2007, available at http://wwv.eastvalleytribune.com/story/1054 4 6 (dis-
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Another criticism that has been leveled against LAWA is that it is
preempted by federal law; that is, it gives state and local officials authority
to regulate immigration in a manner that is reserved exclusively to the
federal government.' 3 Preemption occurs when state law conflicts with
federal law or when state law poses an obstacle to the operation of federal
law." State laws that affect immigration, even if they do not purport to
dictate who stays and who goes, are frequently preempted because they
run the risk of interfering with the vast regulatory scheme that Congress
created to control immigration.' 5
When state and federal law enforcement approach the problem of
undocumented immigrant workers in the same manner, it is difficult to
see how the state law could interfere with the operation of the federal law.
This is currently the case with LAWA and similar laws in other states
("employer sanctions laws")." After all, the raids in Iowa and Arizona both
targeted businesses, rather than undocumented employees. Both were car-
ried out pursuant to statutes prohibiting employers from hiring
undocumented workers. Both sought to achieve the overarching goal of
reducing illegal immigration by removing opportunities to work. Perhaps
cussing how fear of the "pending crackdown on employers who hire illegal residents"
harms Hispanic-oriented businesses and communities); Nathan Newman, Costs of Anti-
hisnorant Legislation, Grassroots Netroots Alliance, Dec. 20, 2007, http://
www.grassrootsnetroots.org/articles/article9 2 32 .cft (noting evidence that economic
output would drop 8.2% annually if non-citizen foreign-born workers were removed
from the labor force and predicting that the law would stall business growth).
13. See Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Arizona Employer Sanctions
Law Takes Effect, Migration Information Source, Jan. 16, 2008, http://
www.migrationinformation.org/ Sfocus/display.cfin?id=669 ("Opponents of the new law
have argued that sanctioning employers of unauthorized workers is an exclusive federal
responsibility, thus preempting states from enacting their own employer sanctions laws.").
The Ninth Circuit recently upheld LAWA against a preemption challenge. Chicanos por la
Causa v. Napolitano, 544 E3d 976,980 (2008). Chicanos will be discussed at length in Part II
of this Note.
14. Gary Endlernan, State hnigtiiraion Legislation and the Preemption Doctrine, 1698
PLI/Corp 123, 154 (2008).
15. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F Supp. 2d 477, 520-21 (M.D. Penn.
2007) (holding that a state law regulating the employment of undocumented imnigrants
was preempted by federal immigration law); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)
(holding that a state law requiring aliens over eighteen to register once a year, among
other things, was preempted).
16. In 2008 alone, nineteen laws regulating the employment of immigrants were
enacted in thirteen states. State Laws Related to Immigrants and Inmigration in 2008,
Immigration Policy Project (Dec. 18, 2008). In 2009, twelve states enacted twenty-one
laws regulating the employment of immigrants. State Law Related to Immigrants and
Immigration in 2009, Inmmigration Policy Project (Dec. 1, 2009). Many of these laws
impose sanctions on employers that hire unauthorized workers. Id. This Note focuses on
Arizona's law because it has been called the harshest of the employer sanctions laws, see,
e.g., John Dougherty, McCain Courts Latino Voters, TkE WASH. INDEP., Sep. 25, 2008, http://
washingtonindependent.com/7855/niccain-courts-latino-vote, and also because it is
enforced in particularly troubling ways, see discussion infra Part I .C, II.A-B.
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most significantly, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE")
officials in Iowa and Sheriff's deputies in Arizona conducted the raids in
the same manner: in the course of collecting evidence against the em-
ployers, they arrested the workers, charged them with various identity
theft crimes, and initiated deportation proceedings. 7 To many, it appears
that LAWA simply makes the federal government's tasks of enforcing the
immigration laws easier." Nevertheless, federal law can preempt a state
law when they share the same purpose.'' Even if state and federal laws
accomplish the same task, if the congenial state law "interferes with the
methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this goal," the
state law must be preempted.'" "In fact, the very fact that state and federal
objectives are the same only heightens the chances for trouble: Conflict is
imminent, the Supreme Court famously noted when 'two separate reme-
dies are brought to bear on the same activity.' "SI
When state and federal authorities are no longer working in a sini-
lar manner toward a similar objective, the argument for preemption is
more clear. This may soon be the case with LAWA and other state em-
ployer sanctions laws, if President Barack Obama responds to calls for a
moratorium on worksite immigration raids such as the one in Postville,
Iowa.22 During his campaign, President Obama indicated that he would
consider suspending immigration raids,'23 at least until Congress passes
new immigration legislation. President Obama has also stated that raids
are ineffective and unjustifiably "placefl all the burdens of a broken system
17. See Jens Manual Krogstad, First group of Postville imm{qiration raid detainees deported
to Mexico, WCF Courier, Jun. 7, 2008, http://wcfcourier.com/articles/2008/06/0 7 /
news/metro/10393155.txt. Although removal is an exclusively federal function, in the
course of the Arizona investigation and raids, local officials supplied information to DHS
that ultimately led to the initiation of deportation proceedings against workers.
18. See, e.g., Mark Kimble, The big debate: Marchers Target Joe Arpaio, TucsoN CmT-
zEN, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/ss/border/111296.php.
19. See Endlenun, supra note 14, at 155-56 (noting that "[ilt is a common niscon-
ception that preemption would not be triggered if both Congress and the state legislature
were guided by similar objectives or sought to eradicate the same perceived evil").
20. International Paper Co. v. Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987).
21. Endleman, supra note 14, at 156 (citing Wisconsin Dep't. of Industry v. Gould
Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986)).
22. See N.C. Aizennian, Ihnni'rant Advocates Reach Out To Obama, WAsH. Pos'., Nov.
12, 2008, at B5 (reporting that Hispanic groups and immigrant advocates called for a halt
to worksite immigration raids); Marisa Trevifio, Sixt,-sevcii percet of the LaIillo vote should
be cnough to pay for a morattorium on, imigrtion raids, LATINLISTA, Nov. 13, 2008,
http://wvw v.latinalisa .net/palabrafinal/2008/I 1/sixtyseven percent of_the_latino_vote_
sh.html (discussing the fact that 67% of the Latino community voted for Obama, and
arguing that "should be enough" for Obama to stop the raids); Karen Lee Ziner, Faith
groups ure noratorium on imntu'ration raids, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 1, 2008, http://
newsblog.projo.com/2008/10/by-karen-lee-zi-2.html.
23. Transcript of the CNN Democratic presidential debate in Texas (Feb. 21, 2008),
available at http://wwv.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/2 I /debate.transcript.index.html.
[Vol. 15:417
Legal Arizona Workers Act
onto immigrant families. 12 ' Accordingly, it is probable that within the next
few years, immigration raids by ICE will be curtailed, while raids by local
officials in Arizona and other states will continue to increase. If the federal
government determines that raids are ineffective to address the problem of
illegal immigration, and chooses to divert its resources toward other
methods while the states continue to arrest, prosecute, and deport un-
documented immigrants, it is more clear that such action could pose a
conflict for the federal enforcement of immigration laws.'5
This Note argues that LAWA would not only be preempted under
such circumstances, but that it is preempted by current federal immigra-
tion law and federal labor law. It examines the law's impacts and
concludes that, even if it withstands legal challenge, federal legislation
should be implemented to end state regulation of the employment of un-
documented immigrants. Part I explains why this Note focuses on LAWA,
as opposed to other state employer sanctions laws, and discusses its rele-
vance to national practitioners and preemption doctrine. Part II discusses
whether LAWA is preempted by federal immigration law. It begins with
the Federal Imigration Reform and Control Act ("IPCA"), the first
major piece of legislation focusing on the employment of undocumented
immigrants, and goes on to explain preemption doctrine generally. The
discussion then reviews arguments for and against preemption, arguing
that Congress intended IMCA to preempt state regulations such as
LAWA. In particular, it notes that IRCA's text, federal court decisions, and
the effects of LAWA indicate that LAWA is preempted. Additionally, it
makes clear that policy considerations weigh in favor of preemption.
Part III considers the possibility of preemption under federal labor
law. After providing some background information on the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"), this Note contends that LAWA interferes with
federally protected labor rights and is thus preempted under the Gannon
doctrine. The discussion then turns to Hoffman Plastics, a monumental de-
cision affecting the rights of immigrant workers, and argues that LAWA
upsets the delicate balance Hoffmnan struck between labor and immigration
law. Finally, this Note reviews the policy goals of federal labor law and
24. Barack Obama and Joe Biden's Plan for Immigration, http://
www.barackobaa'.coim/issues/inigration.
25. This note does not mean to suggest that inmigration raids will completely cease
under President Obama. Some degree of immigration enforcement will certainly continue
while the new President considers immigration reform options, and even if immigration
reform-with a legalization path for undocumented migrants-becomes a reality, some
type of workable employer sanction mechanism will be necessary for it to succeed in
Congress. The purpose of this Note is to suggest that employer sanctions should be han-
dled by the federal government and not by the states, both because the preemption
doctrine requires it, and because federal regulations would likely be more favorable to
undocumented immigrants. It is unlikely that the nation would support a law as harsh as
LAWA and also unlikely that ICE could enforce a federal law as strictly as state and local
officials, for reasons discussed in this Note.
SPRINr_ 2010]
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highlights how the practical results of LAWA suggest that it should be
preempted.
I. LAWA AND THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER
Although this Note focuses on LAWA, the analysis is relevant to
practitioners nationwide. Both the preemption analysis and the policy-
based criticisms apply to employer sanctions laws in states other than Ari-
zona. In 2008 and 2009, various states enacted a total of forty-one laws
regulating the employment of immigrants.-" Many of these laws impose
sanctions on employers that hire unauthorized workers.2 This Note fo-
cuses on Arizona's law because it has been called the harshest of the
employer sanctions laws.2' Arizona, however, is not unique. LAWA is par-
ticularly harsh because it permanently strips businesses of their licenses
after a few violations, but laws that suspend or revoke business licenses
after many violations are still preempted by federal immigration law for
the reasons outlined in this Note.
LAWA is also significant because it will likely serve as a model for
other state employer sanctions laws. It is the first law specifically designed
to conform to preemption exemptions in federal immigration law. Past
state laws have been quickly struck down because they clearly violate pre-
emption doctrine. LAWA is more carefully crafted and so less obviously in
conflict with preemption doctrine. Accordingly, other states will follow
Arizona's example and similar provisions. This possibility has become sub-
stantially more likely since the Ninth Circuit upheld LAWA against a
preemption challenge.Thus, the preemption analysis here will be useful to
national practitioners. In fact, it may be more useful to practitioners in
other states that are not bound by the Ninth Circuit's holding.
This Note also focuses on Arizona's law because it is enforced in
particularly troubling ways.-" Again, Arizona is not unique. LAWA en-
forcenient is particularly troublesome because anti-immigration sentiment
in Arizona is high, but flourishes also in non-border states across the
country. Practitioners in these states may be able to challenge the dis-
criminatory or retaliatory enforcement of employer sanctions laws.
Federal immigration raids highlight the danger of employers in states
other than Arizona using employer sanctions laws to flout federal labor
law. Although these raids were triggered by federal immigration law, as
more states adopt their own laws, employers will increasingly contact state
26. State Laws Related to Immigrants and Immigration in 2008, supra note 16. State
Laws Related to Immigrants and Immigration in 2009, supra note 16.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g.,John Dougherty, McCain Courts Liatino Voters, THE WASH. INDEP., Sep. 25,
2008, http://washingtonindependent.com/7855/mccain-courts-latino-vote.
29. See discussion infra Part IC, II.A-B.
[Vol. 1 5:417
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authorities rather than ICE. As this Note argues, this type of enforcement
is preempted by federal labor law. Accordingly, this Note's discussion of
Arizona's enforcement concerns is relevant to practitioners nationwide.
Previous scholarship discusses the relationship between federal and
state employer sanctions laws.30 This Note furthers the scholarship by ex-
ploring how preemption doctrine applies to LAWA-the first state law
crafted specifically to circumvent federal immigration law's preemption
provisions. Preemption of employer sanctions laws by labor law is less well
researched .' Michael Duff argues that state regulation of immigration
rallies is preempted because immigration rallies are a protected by federal
labor law.-2 This Note, by contrast, argues that state regulation of inmi-
grant employment is preempted because employers use these regulations
as pretext for committing a variety of labor violations against undocu-
mented employees.1
II. PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW:
A COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME OF REGULATION
A. Background
Congress first addressed the employment of undocumented immi-
grants with the Federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.14
IRCA makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire or recruit immi-
grants without lawful work authorization ("undocumented
immigrants"). -5 IRCA also requires employers to complete an 1-9 form
for each new hire, verifying that the individual was authorized to work in
the United States".1 Before IPCA went into effect, the Immigration and
Nationality Act penalized undocumented immigrants for their illegal en-
try into the U.S., but did not punish employers who hired these
30. See generally Endleman, supra note 14 (summarizing preemption doctrine); Adam
L. Lounsbury, A Nationalist Critique of Local Laws Purporting to Regulate the Hiring of Un-
documented Workers, 71 ALB. L. REv. 415 (2008) (arguing for preemption); Rick Su, Notes on
the Multiple Facets of Inigration Federalism, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179 (2008) (argu-
ing against preemption).
31. See, e.g., Michael C. Duff, Days Without Inmigrants:Analysis and Implications of the
Treatment of himnigration Rallies Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 DENy. U. L. REV.
93 (2007).
32. See id.
33. Additionally, Lounsbury mentions San Diego Bldgs. Trade Council v. Gannon, the
primary labor case discussed in this Note, but only in the context ofinmmigration preemp-
tion, rather than labor preemption. See Lounsbury, supra note 30, at 442.
34. Endleman, supra note 14, at 128-29.
35. Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2009).
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immigrants." Despite wide acceptance that jobs were a magnet for un-
documented immigrants, the INA treated the employment of
undocumented immigrants as a peripheral concern."
Before [RCA, states regulated the employment of undocumented
immigrants under the authority of their police powers." States typically
asserted the preservation of employment opportunities for its own citizens
as a justification for restricting the employment of undocumented inter-
ests. ' In DeCanas v. Bica, a landmark decision upholding a California state
law prohibiting the employment of undocumented immigrants, the Su-
preme Court found this to be a legitimate state interest.' In dicta, the
Supreme Court attempted to delineate the bounds of federal authority
over immigration: Congress was concerned with "who should or should
not be admitted into the country," and not with the employment of un-
documented immigrants. '2
Despite this powerful statement, DeCanas does not apply similarly to
all state immigration regulations. Although LAWA imposes different sanc-
tions than the California statute at issue in DeCanas, both laws regulate
the same activity-the employment of undocumented immigrants. 3 On
the question of whether LAWA is preempted by federal immigration law,
37. Endleman, supra note 14, at 128.
38. Garrett Kennedy, illlal is Not Siiply llle, al: The Broad Ramifications of a Peuusyl-
vnia Town's Attemipt at Iigratiion Control, and the Iherent Problems of Racial Discrimination,
10 U. PA.J. Bus. & EMi,. L. 1029, 1038 (2008) ("While the INA sought to penalize indi-
viduals who immigrated illegally into the United States, it did not take proactive measures
of deterrence, as employers could freely hire workers without fear of redress.").
39. See Karl Manheim, State immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HAsr-
INGS CONs'I; L.Q. 939,995-96 (1995).
40. Sec id.
41. Sec DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (observing that "[sitates possess
broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to
protect workers within the State .... California's attempt ... to prohibit the knowing em-
ployment by California employers of persons not entitled to lawful residence in the
United States, let alone to work here, is certainly within the mainstream of such police
power regulation.").
42. See id. at 355 (reasoning that the fact that an immigrant is the subject of a state
statute does not render it a regulation of immigration, "which is essentially a determina-
tion of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under
which a legal entrant may remain"); Endleman, supra note 14, at 166, 168 (noting that
absolute preemption does not arise whenever the challenged state law references immi-
grants and reminding that, at the time of Bica, the Supreme Court did not think
immigration law extended to the regulation of immigrant employment).
43. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 353 n. I (citing the California statute, which prescribed
a fine between $200 and $500 each time an employer violated the law). Comupare LAWA
§ 23-212, which sets forth a number of sanctions increasing in severity for each violation.
After one violation the employer must terminate all of the undocumented immigrants and
is put on probationary status for three years. If a second violation occurs during this pro-
bation, the employer loses its business license.The LAWA sanctions are discussed further in
Part I.
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DeCanas is not dispositive, however, because it was decided prior to the
passage of IRCA.4" The Supreme Court rested its decision in DeCanas on
the fact that the INA did not concern the employment of undocumented
iminigrants4 IRCA, by contrast, directly addresses the employment is-
sue.4"' The relevant question in determining whether IRCA preempts state
employer sanctions laws is Congress's intent." As we seek to discover
Congress's intent regarding preemption and IRCA, we consider the text
of the statute, subsequent legislative action, as well as judicial decisions
that shed light on the analysis.
B. Inmigration Preemption Doctrine Applied to LAWA
1.Text of the Statute
As noted above, IRCA prescribes criminal and civil penalties on
employers that knowingly hire or recruit undocumented immigrants." To
prevent employers from taking advantage of the knowingly provision by
intentionally failing to look into the status of employees, IRCA also re-
quires employers to complete an 1-9 form for each new hire, verifying
that the individual was authorized to work in the United States."' Addi-
tionally, and most importantly for this Note, IRCA contains a preemption
clause:
The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law
imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through li-
censing and similar laws) upon those who employ, recruit or
refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens." '
This clause clearly applies to and preempts state and local laws that im-
pose civil or criminal penalties on employers for hiring undocumented
immigrants)' LAWA, however, does not impose criminal or civil penalties
44. See Endleman, supra note 14, at 169 ("It has always been assumed that the Court
would decide DeCanas differently today.").
45. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358-59 (concluding that employment of immigrants is
not a central concern of the INA).
46. See Endleman, supra note 14, at 159 (discussing how IRCA created a "compre-
hensive scheme" to control employment of undocumented immigrants).
47. See Endleman, supra note 14, at 127 (stating that the intent of Congress is the
"ultimate touchstone" in every preemption case).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (reiterating that Congress's
purpose "is the ultimate touchstone" in every preemption case) (internal citations onit-
ted).
SPRING 2010]
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for violation of its provisions : Rather, it prescribes license suspensions
and probations of increasing length each time the terms of the law are
violated." Ultimately, it mandates license revocation for an employer who
knowingly or intentionally employs an undocumented immigrant while
on probation for a previous violation."
On one reading, the exception to the preemption clause that allows
"licensing and similar laws" expressly permits LAWA. After all, LAWA is
facially a licensing law." A House Report on IRCA supports the view
that Arizona's decision to suspend and revoke licenses to employers that
hire undocumented immigrants is lawful. This report mandates that
[t]he penalties contained in this legislation are intended to spe-
cifically preempt any state or local laws providing civil fines
and/or criminal sanctions on the hiring, recruitment or refer-
ral of undocumented aliens.They are not intended to preempt
or prevent lawful state or local processes concerning the sus-
pension, revocation or refusal to reissue a license to any person
who has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions
in this legislation. "
Under this reading, because LAWA mandates the revocation of a business
license from an employer who hires undocumented immigrants, it is a
licensing law.
Another view is that, although the text of the preemption clause ap-
pears to authorize Arizona's law, a closer look at the circumstances
surrounding IRCA and the practical results of LAWA suggests that Con-
gress intended IRCA to preempt laws such as LAWA. First, LAWA
operates more like an immigration regulation than a licensing law. Al-
though it imposes conditions a business must satisfy to retain a license, it is
unlike any licensing law that existed prior to the implementation of
IRCA. Prior to IRCA, licensing law referred to a law about licensing that
"sets forth conditions and qualifications governing the issuance of a par-
ticular license to a particular type of business" such as a medical license or
a childcare license.57 LAWA is not a licensing law that applies to a specific
type of business, but a law about immigration and undocumented work-
ers. Rather than setting standards by which the state expects a particular
type of business to operate, LAWA imposes a broad rule that business
52. See LAWA § 23-212.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. This is the view taken by the U.S. District Court of Arizona. See Arizona Con-
tractors Ass'n v. Candelaria, 534 E Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (D. Ariz. 2008). In Candelaria, Judge
Neil Wake concluded that LAWA is a licensing law because it "sets out criteria and a proc-
ess to suspend or revoke a permission to do business in the state."
56. H.R.. Rep. No. 99-682(1) at 5662.
57. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 28, Candelaria, 534 E Supp. 2d 1036.
[Vol. 15:417
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cannot hire undocumented immigrants. The purpose of this rule is not to
improve the quality of services employers provide to the public, but to
discourage immigration into the state. In this way, it functions like an
immigration regulation, designed post-IRCA to fit into the preemption
savings clause.'"
Second, LAWA's penal provisions are incompatible with the text and
spirit of ICA's preemption clause. The preemption clause bars states
from merely imposing fines against employers that break the law. This is
incongruous with an interpretation of IRCA's preemption exception that
lets states strip employers of their business licenses-essentially imposing a
"death penalty"'" by putting employers that break the law out of business.
Such an interpretation would render the preemption clause, which pro-
hibits states from imposing criminal or civil sanctions on businesses,
meaningless."
Finally, IRCA must be read in conjunction with the larger body of
immigration law. It has long been accepted that only Congress has the
authority to determine who gets to stay in the U.S. and who has to
leave."' Since IRCA's preemption clause must be read in light of this gen-
eral proposition, licensing penalties are permitted only when the federal
government has determined that an employer violated the law." The House
Report cited above supports this interpretation. "The penalties contained
in this legislation ... are not intended to preempt or prevent lawful state
or local processes concerning the suspension, revocation or refusal to reis-
sue a license to any person who has been found to have violated the
sanctions provisions in this legislation."' 3 The federal government deter-
mines when a person has violated this legislation-namely, IRCA.
Accordingly, for a state to suspend, revoke, or refuse to reissue a license
to a person found in violation of some other law, the federal government
must first have found that person in violation of IRCA.
58. See id. (noting that title does not refer to licensing and is codified separately from
any licensing provisions).
59. See Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Arizona Employer Sanctions Law
Takes Effect, TnE MIurION IMMIGRATION SOURCE, Jan. 16, 2008, http://
www. migrationinfornation.org/USfocus/display.cfin?id=669.
60. See Hazleton, 496 E Supp. 2d at 519 (explaining that because suspension of a
business permit is the "ultimate sanction", it would not make sense for Congress to allow
states to suspend business permits, but no lesser penalty, and concluding that such an inter-
pretation makes "the express preemption clause nearly meaningless"). See also Omega
World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
"reading of [a] preemption clause [that] would ... turn an exception to a preemption
provision into a loophole so broad that it would virtually swallow the preemption clause
itself" because to do so "would undermine Congress' plain intent").
61. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355.
62. Brief for plaintiffs at 12, Chicanos por la Cansa v. Napolitano, 544 F3d 976 (9th
Cir. 2008) (No. 07-17272).
63. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(1) at 5662 (emphasis added).
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LAWA allows the state to suspend or revoke licenses even if the fed-
eral government has not made such a determination.'4 This violates the
maxim that Congress determines who stays in the U.S. by allowing Ari-
zona, pursuant to LAWA, to create a separate state adjudicatory process in
which state court judges determine whether an employer has violated
federal immigration law.The results of this separate system further suggest
that Congress intended to preempt state employer sanctions laws. Allocat-
ing such power to state judges undermines federal power to regulate
immigration. The scheme also impairs ICA, which sought to create a
comprehensive federal system with procedures for determining which
employers knowingly hired unauthorized immigrants by introducing
non-uniformity. "' The fact that Arizona is not the only state with an em-
ployer sanctions law heightens the risk of obstructing federal enforcement
of IMCA."" Federal immigration law is sufficiently broad to call into ques-
tion the notion that there is room for the fifty states to intervene with
fifty different immigration laws.'67 It is doubtful that Congress intended its
seven-word preemption clause to give states the opportunity to weaken
the newly created regulatory scheme.
2.Judicial Decisions
Since the passage of IRCA, many state immigration regulations have
been challenged on the grounds that they are preempted." Judicial re-
sponses to these challenges provide additional guidance as to whether
Congress intended to preempt LAWA. Although it was decided before
IRCA went into effect, DeCanas remains relevant to preemption analysis.
DeCanas stands for the proposition that "when it comes to preemption,
... a law that concerns itself with alien employment is not necessarily a
64. See LAWA § 23-212. LAWA does not require a federal determination that an
employer has violated IR CA before the state of Arizona may file charges under LAWA.
65. See Hoffinan Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)
("IRCA 'forcefully' made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to '[tihe
policy of immigration law.' " (citing INS v. Nat'l Ctr. For Imigrants' Rights, 502 U.S.
183, 194, and n.8 (1991))).
66. See snpra note 16 discussing other state immigration laws.
67. See Endleman, supra note 14, at 160 ("Though field preemption is neither easily
nor quickly inferred, it may be presumed when the federal law is sufficiently comprehen-
sive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state
regulation.") (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Cf Schnei-
dewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1998) (field preemption applies if
"pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes supplementation by the States," or if"the
federal interest is sufficiently dominant"). See also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,305 (1993)
(discussing immigration and noting that "[olver no conceivable subject is the legislative
power of Congress more complete"); See also Manheim, supra note 31 (arguing that since
"immigration is plainly a matter of national moment, state interference is not tolerated").
68. See supra note 15 listing immigration preemption cases.
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regulation of immigration."" As discussed above, LAWA regulates inrin-
gration by allowing states to sanction employers that violate federal
immigration law by deciding whether to sanction an employer that has
hired an undocumented immigrant worker, a function that is generally
reserved for the federal government. However, DeCanas instructs us that
this may not be the case. According to the Supreme Court in DeCanas,
the regulation of immigration is "a determination of who should or
should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which
a legal entrant may remain."7 ' Under the logic of DeCanas, because a state
decision to sanction an employer that hired an undocumented worker is
not a decision about who should be admitted into the country, it is not an
immigration regulation reserved to the federal government.
The logic of DeCanas, however, is not the only factor to consider in
determining whether a law regulates immigration. It is important to note
that the immigration landscape is vastly different since the implementa-
tion of IRCA. It is likely that, under today's circumstances, DeCanas
would come out differently. DeCanas rested on the claim that the em-
ployment of unauthorized immigrants was "a merely peripheral concern"
of federal immigration law.' This is not the case in a post-IRCA world
where congressional comprehensive immigration reform looms on the
horizon.12 Unlike prior immigration laws, IRCA is a "carefully crafted
compromise which at every level balances specifically chosen measures
discouraging illegal employment with measures to protect those who
might be adversely affected."" In recognition of this, the Supreme Court
changed its pre-IRCA stance that the NLRA does not protect undocu-
mented immigrants.74 Preemption doctrine, just like the NLRA, also
applies differently post-IRCA. Accordingly, although DeCanas remains
relevant, its application has changed.
69. Endlernan, supra note 14, at 166.
70. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358.
71. Garnmon, 359 U.S. at 243.
72. In 2006 and 2007, Congress attempted to pass comprehensive inmmigration re-
form measures that proposed, among other things, to increase security along the U.S.-
Mexico border, allow long-time undocumented immigrants a path to citizenship, and to
create a new visa program that would increase the number of guest workers in the U.S, as
well as increased enforcement measures. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, S.
2611, 109th Cong. (2006); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348,
100th Cong. (2007). After much debate, the attempted reforms collapsed. See Robert Pear
& Carl Hulse, hmmigration Bill Dies in Senate; Defeat for Bush, N.Y TIMES,Jun. 28, 2007, at
AO. Since then, groups from both ends of the political spectrum have increased the
strength .of their cries for inmmigration reform.
73. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F2d 1350, 1966 (9th Cit.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 183 (1991).
74. See Endleman, supra note 14, at 199 (noting that the Supreme Court has refined
its pre-IRCA decisions before).
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The most important case for this analysis is Chicanos por la Causa v.
Napolitano, the Ninth Circuit decision upholding LAWA against a facial
challenge." The court held that LAWA fell within IP.1CA's preemption
exception and that the provision requiring employers to participate in E-
Verify was not impliedly preempted by IRCA.7" The decision rested
squarely on the DeCanas court's conclusion that "the authority to regulate
the employment of unauthorized workers is 'within the mainstream' of
the state's police powers."" The court cursorily dismissed the plaintiffs'
argument that IR.CA brought the regulation of undocumented immi-
grants within the scope of federal immigration law, stating that "because
the power to regulate the employment of unauthorized aliens remains
within the states' historic police powers, an assumption of non-
preemption applies.""
The Ninth Circuit's holding rested on its conclusion that DeCanas
remains good authority for the proposition that the employer sanctions
laws are a traditional exercise of a state's police power. This conclusion
essentially removes any effect that IRCA might have had from the pre-
emption calculus and, as such, is not persuasive. Chicanos was the first and
only post-IRCA federal decision to grant DeCanas such binding author-
ity." In fact, at least one federal court reached a contrary conclusion
before Chicanos was decided."'
In Hazleton, a Pennsylvania district court confronted a municipal or-
dinance that prohibited the employment of undocumented immigrants
and purported to punish an offending employer by suspending its business
permit."' Like Arizona in Chicanos, the City of Hazleton argued its ordi-
nance had been designed with "exacting precision" so that it would fall
within IRCA's licensing exception. 2 The court rejected this argument,
noting that an interpretation of the savings clause which allowed the city
to force an offending employer out of business with the "ultimate sanc-
tion"--suspension of the business permit-would completely eviscerate
the clause. "3 With respect to DeCanas, the court stated that with the pas-
sage of IRCA, the employment of undocumented workers went from
being addressed in a portion of a single section of the INA to being the
subject of an entire statutory scheme. " The court also stated that since
75. 544 F3d 976,988 (2008).
76. Id. at 985,988.
77. Id. at 983 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356).
78. Id. at 984.
79. See Endleman, supra note 14, at 169-170 (noting the novelty of the Chicanos
decision).
80. Hazleton, 496 E Supp. at 519-21.
81. Id. at 519.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 524.
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IRCA, the strong federal interest in immigration " and the pervasiveness
of immigration regulations suggest that Congress intended to preempt the
entire field of the employment of undocumented immigrants." According
to the court, therefore, any reliance on DeCanas for the argument that the
power to regulate the employment of unauthorized workers belonged to
the states was misplaced. "7
So which decision is correct? In Chicanos, the Ninth Circuit inter-
preted DeCanas as asking whether states' historic police powers included
the power to regulate the employment of undocumented immigrants. By
contrast, the Hazleton court asked whether Congress intended to regulate
the employment of undocumented immigrants, and not whether the
power to regulate was part of the states' historic police powers. This made
the passage of IRCA consequential for the Hazleton court, because it in-
dicated that the Congress had evinced an intent to regulate the
employment of undocumented immigrants. This also offers the more per-
suasive reading of the DeCanas decision, which, significantly, did not find
that the authority to regulate the employment of undocumented immi-
grants is a power historically or traditionally belonging to the states, but in
fact was premised on a finding that Congress intended the INA to pre-
clude state regulation on the subject."" The court's conclusion that the
Ninth Circuit's dismissal of decades of post-IRCA regulation in favor of a
historic police power appears to have been conjured out of thin air. Ac-
cordingly, the Hazleton decision offers the better reading.
3. Effects of LAWA
Although the Ninth Circuit held that LAWA fit easily into the cate-
gory of legislation permitted by [RCA's savings clause," the court did
note that it was only upholding the law against a facial challenge "brought
against a blank factual background of enforcement and outside the con-
text of any particular case.""' The court stated that its decision would not
control other challenges to LAWA as applied in a particular manner."'
Consequently, it is appropriate to consider the practical results of state or
85. Id. (noting that DeCatias affirmed that the power to regulate immigration is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power) (internal citations omitted).
86. Id. at 521-25.
87. Id. at 524.
88. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357-58.
89. See Fischer, supra note 58.When asking about IRCA's preemption clause during
oral arguments, Judge Wake asked, "[d]oesn't that pretty much say there is no preemption
for state licensing sanctions laws" and scoffed at an argument that the clause was more
complicated. See id.
90. Chicanos, 544 F3d at 980.
91. Id.
SPRING; 2010]
Michiganjournal of Race & Lau[
local enforcement of LAWA in determining the likelihood that it will be
preempted.
As discussed above, enforcement of LAWA will necessarily require
state judges to make determinations about whether employers knowingly
or intentionally hire undocumented workers. There is already confusion
over what "knowingly" or "intentionally" means in this context. State and
federal courts may adopt different standards of proof or employ different
tests to determine whether an employer acted knowingly or intentionally.
Applying different standards will add non-uniformity and complexity to
immigration law. For example, at the state level, if an employer checked a
new hire's personal information using E-Verify, it has an affirmative de-
fense against a charge of LAWA violation. At the federal level, the use of
E-Verify is not mandatory, so it is easier for an employer to rebut a pre-
sumption that it knowingly or intentionally hired an undocumented
immigrant. The practical result of this is that state and federal courts could
come to different conclusions regarding employers that engaged in similar
conduct. The fact that IRCA demands a certain threshold of knowledge
and does not require employers to investigate the immigration status of
each new employee indicates that Congress did not intend the burden on
employers to be too great. Accordingly, Arizona's harsher treatment of
employers creates a preemption problem.
LAWA will likely lead to increased state immigration raids. This will
prove problematic for a number of reasons.The first is that it increases the
compliance risks for employers.' -2 Gary Endleman explains that, while fed-
eral immigration law enforcement officials specialize in immigration law,
state officials "likely have little to no experience with immigration law"
and that businesses in states with employer sanctions laws must "be aware
that at any time local authorities may start an investigation of their work
force, in some cases based on an anonymous complaint."" This has already
proven true in Arizona. The Maricopa County Sheriff's Department runs
a hotline that allows callers to anonymously report suspected LAWA vio-
lations. This exposes Arizona employers to a risk of investigation by local
authorities that far exceeds the chances of federal investigation. Actions by
the Maricopa County Sheriff's Department also highlight the risk that
inexperienced local authorities may take their authority to investigate
employer sanctions violations too far. For instance, critics of LAWA assert
that the Sheriff's Department engages in discriminatory enforcement and
racial profiling."4 Others complain that its crime sweeps are impermissible
92. See Endleman, supra note 14, at 138.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Spenser S. Hsu, Ariz. SherffAccuscd of Racial Profiling, WASH. POST,JUl 17,
2008, at A02; Sheriff raising fitror wiith iinm(lratioiz raids, MSNBC, Apr. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24314764. Members of Congress have also asked DHS
and the Department of justice to investigate the accusations that Sheriff Joe Arpaio en-
gaged in racial profiling and other abuses of Latinos in Maricopa County. See Randal C.
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breaches of an agreement requiring it to obtain the consent of local au-
thorities before using immigration deputies to operate in their
communities. " These effects demonstrate how LAWA interferes with fed-
eral immigration law and thus bolster the argument for preemption.
C. Policy Considerations
The above arguments seek to establish that LAWA is preempted by
federal immigration law. Given the conflict between federal courts on the
validity of employer sanctions laws and the outcry against the enforce-
ment of LAWA in Arizona, it is likely that this issue will ultimately reach
the Supreme Court. Once there, the Supreme Court will consider the
legal considerations laid out above. Because the argument for employer
sanctions laws relies on the idea that they are necessary for states to com-
bat illegal immigration, the Supreme Court should also consider the
policy implications of state employer sanctions laws in deciding whether
LAWA is preempted. Proponents of these laws contend first that states
need the authority to regulate matters of particular concern to their
communities. They also argue that states need the authority to regulate
immigration when Congress fails to act. A determination that LAWA
does not satisfy these stated purposes therefore undermines the very rea-
son for state authority over the employment of undocumented
immigrants. While these policy-based criticisms of LAWA do not factor
explicitly into the preemption calculus, they provide context for under-
standing how employer sanctions laws like LAWA operate and underscore
the significance of the preemption doctrine and its role in preserving fed-
eral authority in the field of immigration.
The first argument provided in support of LAWA is that Arizona, as
a border state, must deal with illegal immigration on a larger scale than
other states and so needs the ability to develop specialized legislation. This
argument is flawed because, despite Arizona's unique position as a border
state, the problem of illegal immigration is common to all states. In par-
ticular, the specific problem that LAWA seeks to address-the
employment of undocumented immigrants-does not respect state
boundaries. The fact that Arizona is a point of entry for many undocu-
mented immigrants who eventually make their way to other states does
Archibold, Lawtiakers Want Look at Sheriff it Arizona, N.Y.TEMES, Feb. 14,2009, at A12.The
order was triggered in part when Sheriff Arpaio's department publicly marched 200 illegal
inmates down city streets on their way from one jail to another. Id. At the second jail,
known as "tent city" they are segregated from other inmates. Id. See also Posting to Pro
Immigrant, http://proinnigrant.blogspot.com (Oct. 3, 2007, 9:53 AM) (noting the possi-
bility that the large number of reports to the hotline could lead to discriminatory
enforcement).
95. Barry Hart, Critics claim SheriffJoe Arpaio' crimne sweep violates rights of cities, Apr.
25, 2008, http://www.immigrateusa.us/content/view/1544/48.
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not establish that federal immigration law is insufficient to address Ari-
zona's immigration concerns. Furthermore, while LAWA might reduce
the number of undocumented immigrant workers in Arizona, it is likely
that it will actually increase the number of undocumented workers in
other states."' Although it can be assumed that immigrants who are ar-
rested in the course of a LAWA investigation will also be deported, there
is evidence that many immigrant workers are not waiting for arrest, but
are fleeing Arizona for states with less stringent employment laws. "' Fur-
thermore, the majority of undocumented workers who cannot find
employment will not be discovered by law enforcement officials, and thus
will not be forced to leave the U.S. The argument that a state should be
permitted to handle regional problems at a regional level loses force when
the state's solution forces its neighbors to share the burden.
It is undeniable that many people are dissatisfied with the federal
government's enforcement of the immigration laws. Despite IRCA's at-
tempt to regulate the employment of undocumented immigrants,
employers still flagrantly violate the law and there has been a surge of un-
documented workers into the U.S." The widespread consensus that
something needs to be done about illegal immigration is what led to the
attempts at comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 and 2007. After
these reforms failed, states like Arizona concluded that there was still a
need for action and passed an onslaught of anti-immigration measures,
including LAWA.They argue that the collapse of the federal immigration
reformis emphasized the need for state action. If Congress could not act,
the states would.
Proponents of these laws argue that they allow "those states harbor-
ing intense anti-alien sentiment to act on those sentiments at the state
level, thus diminishing any interest on their part to seek national legisla-
tion to sinilarly restrictionist ends.""' The crux of this claim seems to lie
not in the premise that some states need to control immigration more
than others, but rather that allowing state experimentation will lead to the
96. See, e.g., Sean Batura, Oklahoma's anti-itmisrant lawv has undocuniented ntoving south,
Feb. 2, 2008, http://media.www.theaccent.org/miedia/storage/paper1074/news/2008/02/04/
News/Oklahomas.Antilmmigration. Law. Has.Undocumented.Moving.South-3186199.shtnl
(observing the movement of undocumented immigrants from Oklahoma to Texas after the
passage of a harsh immigration law in the former).
97. Illegal immigranrs leaving Arizoia, Dec. 22,2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
nation/2007-12-22-imnigration-leaving__N.htnm (citing evidence that undocumented
immigrants fled Arizona for other states in the months before LAWA went into effect).
98. Jeffrey S. Passel, A Portrait of Unauthorized mnrii rants in the United States,
PEw HISPANIC CENTER, Apr. 14, 2009, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1190/portrait-
unauthorized-immiigrants-states ("[Tlhe undocumented immigrant population grew rap-
idly from 1990 to 2006 but has since stabilized.").
99. See Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live iwith hntiration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1627, 1627 (1997).
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development of more immigrant-friendly laws in at least some states.""
This will encourage undocumented immigrants to relocate to these states
with more lenient laws, which in turn will reduce the pressure on states
with high undocumented populations. One scholar rebuts this argument,
contending that "rather than providing a steam-valve for individual states'
to release their pent up frustration with growing immigration related
costs and burdens, [state immigration controls] instead have an incendiary
effect setting off a wild-fire of anti-inmmigrant laws throughout the states
and ultimately implicating national immigration policy.""" The rapid rise
of immigration laws in states that are traditionally not burdened with
large populations of undocumented immigrants buffets McCormick's ar-
gument, as does the fact that these laws are increasingly severe. "
2
State immigration laws, including employer sanctions laws, are on
the rise, despite their negative effect on local communities. Rather than
improving the economy and opening up jobs for legal Arizona residents,
LAWA has been partially responsible for an economic decline that is ex-
pected to get worse."" Undocumented immigrants are not the only ones
fleeing the state since LAWA went into effect. Unwilling to face sanctions,
some businesses have relocated to other states with less punitive employ-
ment laws."" Still others are moving their operations to Mexico, where
they can keep employing foreign workers." ' Some might argue that this is
a positive; less employers breaking the law in Arizona is a good thing. But
some of LAWA's unintended consequences have harmed innocent parties.
For example, documented immigrants-those working or living legally in
the U.S.-are also leaving Arizona, either because they want to remain
with undocumented family members or because they fear the strong anti-
immigrant political climate." In addition, some businesses have been
forced to close shop not because they employ undocumented immigrants,
100. See Peterj. Spiro, Te States and Imnzqrationi in an Era of Dei-Sovereignties, 35 VA.
J. IN'r'L. L. 121,174 (1994).
101. See Elizabeth McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizenship Protection Act:
Blowing Off Steam or Settink Wild-Fires?, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 293, 300 (2009) (attributing
this phenomenon to lobbying efforts by national anti-immigrant groups).
102. See Jennifer M. Hansen, Sanctuary's Demise: The Unintended Effects of State and
Local Enforcement of Imigration Law, Comment, 10 SCHoLAR 289 (2008) (discussing how
local enforcement of immigration laws threatens sanctuary cities).
103. See Nathan Newman, Costs of Anti-lIntigrant Legislation, Dec. 20, 2007, http://
www.grassrootsnetroots.org/articles/article_923 2.cfii (citing a study that predicted LAWA
would lead to 8.2% drop in economic output in Arizona).
104. See Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Arizona Employer Sanctions Law Takes
Effect,Jan. 16, 2008, http://www.migrationinforniation.org/USfocus/display.cfi?id=66 9 .
105. See id.
106. Randall C. Archibold, Arizona Seeingq Skns of Flight by Ihnigrats, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2008.
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but because they cater largely to immigrant communities."" Finally, lest
we forget, Arizona has a large population of documented immigrants and
citizens of Hispanic ancestry. Many condemn LAWA for permitting racial
profiling and discrimination by local and state authorities.""
This Note does not contend that the federal government does not
also face problems enforcing immigration laws. However, chances of dis-
cerning and addressing flaws in a nationwide uniform system of
immigration regulation are greater than the chances of repairing hundreds
of state laws that conflict not only with each other, but with the federal
scheme as well.
Ill. PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL LABOR LAw:A DELICATE BALANCE
A. Background
The primary federal tool for governing the relationship between
employers and workers is the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRA
protects the rights of all workers, including undocumented immigrants, to
form labor unions and to participate in concerted activity for mutual aid
and protection."" Like IRCA, the NLRA is a comprehensive scheme of
regulations that brought the field of labor law-once the province of the
states-under the control of the federal government. This section argues
that federal labor law also preempts LAWA and similar employer sanctions
laws.
There are two primary labor law preemption doctrines: Cannon
preemption and Machinists preemption. Machinists preemption forbids
both the NLRB and the states from regulating conduct that Congress
intended to leave unregulated."" It is based on the premise that Congress
struck a balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez-faire in respect to
union organization, collective bargaining, and labor disputes."' Cannon
preemption is most relevant for our purposes. Unlike Machinists, Cartnon
preemption precludes state interference with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board's ("NLRB") ability to interpret and enforce the "integrated
scheme of regulation" established by the NLRA."' In order to protect this
function of the NLRB, the doctrine forbids states from regulating activity
that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or even arguably protects or prohib-
107. Lindsay Butler, Businesses feel early pinch of ininmiration law, EAST VALLEY TRIB.,
Dec. 29, 2007, http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/story/105446.
108. See supra note 94.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2007); See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893-94
(1986).
110. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 427 U.S. 132, 140-41 (1976).
111. Id. at 140 n.4 (citing Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 H.Av. L.
REV. 1337, 1352 (1972)).
112. Garoon, 359 U.S. at 247.
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its.' Gannon preemption is based on "the expressed congressional desire
for uniformity in the nation's labor policy" and the desire "to make use of
the Board's expertise in the area of labor relations."'14 For example, in
Gannon, the California Superior Court ordered a labor union to pay
damages to an employer for picketing before being certified as the bar-
gaining agent of the employees." ' The Supreme Court held that the state
court's action was preempted because the picketing was arguably pro-
tected by the NLRA."'
In the context of state immigration legislation, the relevant question
is whether the law seeks to regulate activity that is arguably protected or
prohibited by the NLRA. As discussed in the previous section, LAWA
regulates the employment of undocumented immigrants. On one hand,
the employment of undocumented immigrants violates another federal
law-IRCA-and so is arguably not protected. On the other hand, un-
documented immigrants fall within the protection of the NLRA, so
perhaps it is protected."' Federal courts have thus far declined to decide
that the hiring of undocumented immigrants is a protected or prohibited
activity."8 For this reason, it is unlikely that Gannon preemption will be
found in a facial challenge to LAWA. It is possible, however, for LAWA to
give rise to a Gartnon preemption claim under certain factual circum-
stances.
B. Labor Preemption Doctrine Applied to LAWA
State enforcement of LAWA will give rise to a preemption claim if
it works as a regulation of an activity that is arguably protected or prohib-
ited by the NLRA. Protected activities usually consist of two or more
employees acting together to improve working conditions, such as wages
and benefits. Examples of protected activities are employees addressing
their employer about working conditions or pay, employees discussing
work-related issues with each other, or any individual employee engaging
in union support or membership."" Although the NLRA was intended to
protect employees' rights to join labor organizations, an employee does
not need to be part of a union to claim the protection of the NLRA.' 
2
113. Id. at 245.
114. See Gannon, 359 U.S. at 241, 246. See also Northwestern Ohio Adm'r, Inc. v.
Walcher & Fox, Inc., 270 E3d 1018, 1027 (6th Cir. 2001) (interpreting Gannon).
115. Gannon, 359 U.S. at 237-38.
116. Gannon, 359 U.S. at 246.
117. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893-94.
118. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, 370 F3d 602, 611 (2004) (assuming without deciding
that hiring undocumented immigrants is protected or prohibited activity).
119. NLRB, Employee Rights, http://wwv.nlrb.gov/workplace-rights/indexaspx.
120. NLRB v.Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1962).
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Additionally, the NLRA protects any employee's right not to engage in
union activities. 121
Although LAWA was intended to punish employers who violate the
immigration laws, it is possible that, in practice, LAWA could become a
mechanism to combat undocumented workers who engage in protected
activities.That is, if employees begin to demand that an employer improve
working conditions, and the employer suspects that the employees are
undocumented, the employer could contact local law enforcement. At
first glance, it might seem like an absurd move for an employer to open
itself up to investigation for LAWA violations. However, if employers un-
derstood LAWA primarily as an excuse for law enforcement officials to
prosecute undocumented immigrants and saw that employers were rarely
penalized, this could offer an attractive way to deal with problematic em-
ployees.
There is evidence to suggest that employers intentionally use federal
immigration laws to deter undocumented employees from exercising their
rights guaranteed by the NLRA. First, on multiple occasions the federal
government conducted worksite immigration raids in the middle of orga-
nizing drives by labor unions. At the time of the raid at the meat
processing plant in Postville, Iowa, a labor union was attempting to organ-
ize the workers.'2 2 Not only did the ICE raid disrupt the organizing drive,
but it eliminated nearly all of the witnesses to labor violations by the
plant, thus reducing the union's chances of bringing successful claims even
on behalf of employees who were not arrested.t 2 Furthermore, the raid
occurred shortly after employees filed a class-action lawsuit against the
company for wages owed and engaged in a walk-out.' -4 Since the raid, the
plant operates with a new illegal immigrant workforce and continues to
report the same substandard working conditions.' 21 Although federal
prosecutors eventually indicted several plant managers, the maximum
penalty is a fine, and the plant will likely stay open. -21
Because it is easier for authorities to prove that an immigrant is in
the country illegally than to prove that an employer knowingly hired an
undocumented immigrant, these cases will almost always hit the workers
harder than the employers. It is likely that in most cases, even if an investi-
121. NLRJ3, What are protected concerted activities?, http://www.nlrb.gov/
workplace-rights/index.aspx. (select "protected concerted activities").
122. See Simone Landon, Imnn~qration Raid Breaks Up Organizing Drive at Iowa Meat-
packing Plant, Labor Notes, http://www.labornotes.org/node/1902.
123. See id. (noting that the labor violations, which included employment of children
and physical abuses by supervisors, were extensive).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Lynda Waddington, Afiprocessors, five Postville plant managers indicted by grandjury,
IOWA INEP., Nov. 21, 2008, http://iowaindependent.com/8844/agriprocessors-five-
postville-plant-managers-indicted-by-grand-jury.
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gation reaches the indictment stage, the state will fail to successfully
prosecute the employer. Accordingly, after the arrest and deportation of its
employees, an employer will be able to replace its workforce with a new
batch of undocumented immigrants.
The Postville, Iowa raid is not the only federal raid that disrupted
activities by a labor organization.' - A recent raid in Mississippi, which was
launched in response to a tip from an employee, also occurred during
contract negotiations.'2' An ICE spokesperson indicated that the employee
was a union member who was frustrated by the fact that his undocu-
miented coworkers were resisting union organizing efforts.'2' It is not clear
what the union member's intent was, but workers fear that it "will help
the company resist demands for better wages and conditions."' -"
The undocumented workers in both Iowa and Mississippi were en-
gaged in activities protected under the NLRA. In Iowa, employees had
the right to approach their employer for better wages and show their sup-
port for the union conducting the organizing drive. They also arguably
had the right to engage in a walk-out to protest working conditions. In
Mississippi, employees had the right to refrain from engaging in union
activities.
Although there is not yet any evidence that state and local immigra-
tion raids correlate with organizing activity, the state raids are conducted
in the same manner and with many of the same effects as the federal
raids.' 3' This suggests LAWA's power as a potential tool for employers to
combat employee organization. For instance, in the year since LAWA
went into effect, the Maricopa County Sheriff's Department has raided
numerous worksites and arrested many undocumented immigrants, often
in response to calls made to the hotline established for people to anony-
mously report LAWA violations. Despite the frequency of the worksite
raids, the county made no mention of using LAWA to prosecute employ-
ers until the fun-park raids in June.'" Almost two years after the fun-park
raids, no employers have been indicted for the LAWA violations, even
127. See David Bacon, Mississippi Workers Fight Racial Division After the Coiuntrys
Largest hnmration Raid, Sep. 24, 2008, http://dbacon.igc.org/lngrants/
2008rnississippiraid.htnl.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Stewart M. Powell, ICE raids often spare employers, Hous. CHRON.,Jun.
30, 2008, at Al; Lornet Turnbull, UPS crackdoni hits workers, spares businesses, SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, http://seattletinies.nwssource.con1/htIl.localnews/20042704 8 1_
ups09ni.htnil; Posting of chaparral to deletetheborder, Employer Sanctions or Employee Sanc-
tions, http://deletetheborder.org/node/2438 (Dec. 28, 2008, 12:01 PM).
132. See Hensley, supra note 8; Paul Giblin, Imigration Raid in Arizona Could Test New
State Law, N.Y.TiMEs,Jun. 12, 2008.
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though the arrested workers were indicted and prosecuted within a
month of the raid.'-"
As discussed with respect to the federal raids, the fact that the state
must prove an employer knowingly or intentionally broke the law simply
makes it much easier to prosecute employees than employers. Another
factor that exists at the state level that increases the chances that LAWA
will be levied against undocumented workers rather than their employers
is the intense anti-immigrant sentiment in Arizona. The continued sup-
port of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Department indicates that the
electorate that voted for LAWA agrees with the crackdown on undocu-
mented immigrants.' 4 This, combined with the unlimited labor pool of
undocumented immigrants ready to replace those who are arrested,' s is
conducive to an environment where employers can flout labor laws and
discourage workers from complaining. If it can be demonstrated that
LAWA is used to this effect, it will give rise to a claim for Gannon pre-
emption.'1 "
C. Policy Considerations
The previous section argues that LAWA is preempted by federal la-
bor law. The NLR.A protects the rights of undocumented workers to
organize and strive to improve working conditions and LAWA restricts
the NLRB's authority to enforce these rights. Proponents of LAWA
might rebut this argument by contending that the NLRI's power to pro-
tect labor rights becomes less important when it conflicts with federal
immigration law. Even if undocumented immigrants are protected by the
NLRA, the law prohibits employers from hiring undocumented workers.
Enforcement of federal labor law, they argue, should not come at the ex-
133. M~irant Sweep at Water Park Leads to Chares, Jun. 24, 2008, http://
ww.azcetral.com/nevws/articles/2008/06/24/20080624indictnentsO6 24 .htnl. One em-
ployer was recently indicted as the result of another raid by local authorities. J.J. Hensley &
Michael Kiefer, Employer sanctions law yields first case, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 19, 2009, at Al.
This remains the only indictment brought against an employer.
134. See Jana Baybado, 'Toughest sheriff' wins re-election, Nov. 5, 2008, http://
ktar.com/?sid=985334&nid=6 (discussing Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio's recent
reelection and noting that many residents support his "crime sweeps that target illegal
immigration, which resultf in scores of arrests after traffic stops and other minor infrac-
tions").
135. See Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Inmmirants: The
Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193,205-07 (2007). The fact that the employment
of undocumented workers is on the rise, despite employer's sanctions laws, indicates that
positions once occupied by arrested employees are being refilled by other undocumented
inmmigrants.
136. See id. at 207-08 (noting that IF.CA resulted in increased labor violations). See
also Duff, supra note 31 (arguing that firing employees for participating in inmmigration
rallies is preempted under Garmon doctrine).
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pense of enforcement of the immigration laws. The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the relationship between immigration and labor in Hoffman
Plastics.'7 In Hoffman, a chemical company fired an undocumented worker
for supporting a union organizing campaign. "' Because the firing violated
the NLRA, the Board ordered the company to pay the employee for
earnings he lost from being fired."' Faced with conflicting federal laws-
the NLRA prohibited the company from firing the employee while
IIRCA prohibited the company from hiring him in the first place-the
Court concluded that IRCA, in the circumstances of the case, trumped
the NLRA and barred the award of backpay.""
In balancing the labor and immigration laws, the Court compared
their requirements and made two major findings that drove its conclusion:
first, granting backpay violated "the core of the immigration law";"' sec-
ond, the court could deny backpay while still satisfying the policy goals of
the NLRA. 2 In balancing IRCA and the NLRA in the preemption con-
text, the Hoffman court's reasoning does not tip the balance the same way.
With respect to the first point, a Supreme Court decision to strike down
LAWA as preempted by federal labor law would not violate the core of
federal immigration law. It would merely prevent state authorities from
enforcing a state immigration law, leaving IRCA intact."I With respect to
the second issue, the Hoffman court relied on the availability of other
remedies under the NLRA, such as cease-and-desist orders, contempt
sanctions, public notice requirements, and reinstatement and backpay for
legal employees, which were "sufficient to effectuate national labor pol-
icy.""' One might argue similarly that enforcement of LAWA does not
detract from these remedies. In practice, however, LAWA enforcement
undermines the force of the labor laws by cutting off undocumented
workers' abilities to bring claims when their rights are violated. As dis-
cussed above, LAWA is a tool employers can use to fire employees
without facing wrongful discharge claims, and then continue to
137. Hofftiaii, 53 U.S. at 144-52.
138. Hofftian, 535 U.S. at 140.
139. Id. at 141-42.
140. Id. at 151-52. Backpay is a connon remedy for labor violations. It is an order
that an employer make up the difference between what the employee was paid and the
amount the employee should have been paid if not for the labor violation.
141. See Developmets in the Law-Jobs and Borders, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2224, 2226-27
(2005).
142. See id. at 2227-28.
143. By contrast, the backpay award at issue in Hoffman would have encouraged em-
ployers to retain employees in violation of IRCA or else face risk of liability for backpay.
It also would have encouraged the employee to remain in the U.S. in violation of other
immigration laws to be eligible for damages. See Developments in the Lam--jobs and Borders,
supra note 139, at 2228.
144. Hoffman, 535 U.S at 152.
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violate the labor rights of replacement workers. "' Although employees
not deported as a result of a LAWA investigation might still bring.a labor
claim, the disclosure implications of such a course effectively "lock work-
ers out of the legal system altogether."' 4'
Finally, LAWA is not consistent with the policy goals of the NLIA
as defined by Hoffman itself. Hoffman is commonly understood as striking
a balance between protecting the rights of undocumented workers and
enforcing immigration laws.' Although removing the significant remedy
of backpay from the table, Hoffinan did not strip undocumented workers
of their NLIA protections.' 4' The policy goal behind Hoffman was to re-
move employer incentives to hire undocumented immigrants."' However,
when LAWA is not used to penalize employers, but as a mechanism to
arrest and deport workers, it upsets Hoffman's careful balance. It encour-
ages employers, who have an endless supply of undocumented workers
and no foreseeable penalties, to keep hiring undocumented workers and
violating their labor rights. In determining whether LAWA is preempted
by federal labor law, requiring labor law to yield to immigration law
would tip the balance too far.
CONCLUSION
In more than two years since the LAWA went into effect, a single
employer has been indicted for violating the law. Nevertheless, its effects
on the state have undoubtedly been far-reaching. In Maricopa County
alone, local officials raided a dozen businesses and arrested 160 workers in
the name of enforcing the law. Countless more undocumented immi-
grants and their families have left the state, some because they were
unable to find work, and others out of fear of the mounting anti-
immigrant sentiment. This has contributed to economic decline, fractured
communities, and divisive political conflict. These deleterious conse-
quences extend across the nation.
145. See Developments in the Lai,--Jobs and Borders, supra note 139, at 2229-30 (dis-
cussing how states have been trespassing on workers' rights since Hoffinan).
146. See id. at 2233-34 (noting that when courts determine that immigration status is
relevant to an aspect of a plaintiffs claim, defense attorneys, defendants, and potential de-
fendants can turn worker-protection claims into deportation threats).
147. See, e.g., id. at 2225-29.
148. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152.
149. See id. at 150-51 (explaining that if the NLKA did not apply to undocumented
immigrants it would encourage employers to hire these people and violate the labor laws,
but that backpay awards would encourage employers to retain employees in violation of
the immigration laws). But see id. at 153-54 (Breyerj., dissenting) (arguing that upholding
the backpay awards would more effectively remove incentives for employers to hire un-
documented workers over legal workers).
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LAWA and comparable employer sanctions laws are preempted by
federal immigration law. State enforcement of LAWA interferes with fed-
eral enforcement of immigration laws and imposes a far higher burden on
employers than Congress intended with IRCA. Changes in the legal
landscape suggest that Congress alone has the authority to regulate the
employment of undocumented immigrants. LAWA, as it is currently en-
forced, is also preempted by federal labor law. State and local officials
target employees, using the law to arrest and deport undocumented im-
migrants while failing to pursue legal action against the employers. This
method of enforcement allows employers to commit labor violations
against undocumented employees and resist employee efforts to organize
and redress those violations. Employer sanctions laws in other states simi-
larly disturb federal enforcement of immigration law, impose enormous
burdens on employers, and harm employees' federally guaranteed labor
rights.
Immigration and employment, although not immune to state regu-
lation, are increasingly regulated by the federal government. Despite the
values of federalism, a Supreme Court decision to uphold LAWA would
set a dangerous precedent. In the last year, twelve states enacted laws
aimed at regulating the employment of undocumented immigrants. Al-
lowing states to run amok with individual solutions to a national problem
reduces the possibility of national immigration reform, leads to discrimi-
natory treatment of individuals, and permits employers to mistreat
undocumented workers. Invalidating LAWA-and other employer sanc-
tions laws designed to circumvent federal immigration law-is necessary
to prevent other states from adopting similar measures. It is likely that
Congress will have an opportunity to implement new immigration legis-
lation before the Supreme Court rules on the legality of LAWA or other
employer sanctions laws. If such an opportunity arises, Congress should
implement legislation that explicitly makes state employer sanctions regu-
lations unlawful, because the costs they impose at both a local and
national level outweigh any benefits they secure in reducing the employ-
ment of undocumented immigrants. Until Congress takes advantage of
that opportunity, national practitioners-whether they be concerned with
business and labor interests, with the treatment of immigrants, or preserv-
ing the supremacy of the federal Constitution-should challenge the
proliferation of state laws that put the these myriad interests at risk.
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